Social choice theory is a theoretical framework for analysis of combining individual preferences, interests, or welfares to reach a collective decision or social welfare in some sense. We introduce a new criterion for social choice protocols called "social disappointment". Social disappointment happens when the outcome of a voting system occurs for those alternatives which are at the end of at least half of individual preference profiles. Here we introduce some protocols that prevent social disappointment and prove an impossibility theorem based on this key concept.
Introduction
In social sciences, we are facing two kinds of social choices: voting which is used to make a political decision and market mechanism as a tool to make an economic decision [1] . Here, we are merely concerned with the former.
The theory underlying voting systems is known as social choice theory and is concerned with the design and analysis of methods for collective decision making [27] . Voting procedures are among the most important methods for collective decision making. In this paper, our attention is on voting procedures. Voting procedures focus on the aggregation of individuals' preferences to produce collective decisions. In practice, a voting procedure is characterized by ballot responses and the way ballots are tallied to determine winners. Voters are assumed to have clear preferences over candidates (alternatives) and attempt to maximize satisfaction with the election outcome by their ballot responses. Voting procedures are formalized by social choice functions, which map ballot response profiles into election outcomes(see [6] , page:175).
We use a broad class of social choice functions such as Condorcet method, Plurality rule, Hare system, Borda count, Sequential Pairwise Voting with a Fixed Agenda (Seq. Pairs), and Dictatorship. Condorcet method is typically attributed to the Marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794); However, it dates back to Ramon Llull in the thirteenth century( [28] p. 6). Hare procedure was introduced by Thomas Hare in 1861, and is also known by names such as the "single transferable vote system"(STV) or "instant runoff voting" ( [28] p. 7). Jean Charles Chevalier de Borda (1733-99) in 1781 [5] introduced an aggregation procedure known as Borda count. Interestingly, recent historical work by McLean, Urken (1993) [17] , and Pukelsheim (unpublished) reveals that Bordas system had been explicitly described in 1433 by Nicholas of Cusa (1401-64), a Renaissance scholar interested in the question of how
Social Disappointment
We start explaining the social disappointment property by the following example. 
The least public resentment procedure (L.P.R):
We observed that none of the famous procedures listed in Table 1 prevents social disappointment. We introduce a procedure which prevents social disappointment in voting, called The least public resentment procedure (L.P.R). In this procedure we begin by deleting the alternative or alternatives occurring at bottom of the most lists. At this stage we have lists that are at least one alternative shorter than the lists we started with. Now, we simply repeat this procedure of deleting the least public resentment alternative or alternatives. The alternative(s) deleted last is declared as the winner. Proof. For this procedure, the description makes it clear that there is at least one winner for every profile. So L.P.R satisfies AAW condition. Suppose that there is a winner that is in the end of at least half of preference profiles. The L.P.R procedure would delete this alternative from profile lists in the first stage, so the social disappointment for this alternative could not occure.
Consider the three alternatives 'a', 'b', and 'c' and the following sequence of seven preference lists grouped into voting blocks of size two, two, two, and one:
The L.P.R procedure produces 'b' as the social choice. However, 'a' is clearly the Condorcet winner, defeating each of the other alternatives in one-on-one competitions. Since the Condorcet winner is not the social choice in this situation, we have that the L.P.R procedure does not satisfy the Condorcet winner criterion. L.P.R procedure satisfies the Pareto condition. Because if in all lists 'b' has occurred down below 'a', therefore at some point 'b' would be gone but 'a' stands still due to the fact that 'b' socially is more resentful than 'a'. So based on social choice procedure in this system 'b' would be eliminated in early stages or at most in comparison with 'a'.
We delete the alternatives which have taken place more than the other alternatives at the end of the votes. In this case, that would be alternatives 'c' and 'b' with the two last places in votes for each as compared to one for 'a'. But now 'a' is the only alternative left, and so it is the social choice when the L.P.R procedure is used. Now suppose that the single voter on the most right changes his or her list by interchanging 'a' with the alternative that is right above 'a' on this list. This apparently favorable-to-'a'-change yields the following sequence of preference lists:
Voters
If we apply the L.P.R procedure again, we delete the alternatives which have taken place more than the other alternatives at the end of the votes. In this case, 'c' is that alternative. But the reader can now easily check that with 'c' so eliminated, alternative 'b' is at bottom of two of the fifth lists. Alternative 'a' is deleted and so 'b' is the social choice. This change in social choice from 'a' to 'c' shows that the L.P.R procedure does not satisfy monotonicity. Notice that we still have 'b' over 'a' in Voter 4s list. However, L.P.R procedure now has 'a' and 'b' tied for the win. Thus, although no one changed his or her mind about whether 'a' is preferred to 'b' or 'b' to 'a', the alternative 'a' went from being a non-winner to being a winner. This shows that independence of irrelevant alternatives fails for the L.P.R procedure. ⊣
A Glimpse of Impossibility
Taylor proved in [29] also [28] pp. 28-31 that there is no social choice procedure for three or more alternatives that satisfies the always-a-winner criterion, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and the Condorcet winner criterion. Now we prove an impossibility theorem based on social disappointment concept.
Theorem 3.1 There is no social choice procedure for four or more alternatives that satisfies the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, and the Condorcet winner criterion.
Proof. We assume that we have a social choice procedure that satisfies the Condorcet winner criterion. We then show that if this procedure is applied to the profile that consists of Condorcets voting paradox [10] , then it produces a winner which will lead to social disappointment. We prove this claim for when we have four alternatives. Assume that we have a social choice procedure that satisfies the Condorcet winner criterion. Consider the following profile: Alternative 'd' is the unique social choice when the Condorcets method is used. Although 'd' is the social choice, but it is at the bottom of individual preference lists and so social disappointment has taken place. ⊣
Corollary 3.1 There is no social choice procedure for four or more alternatives that satisfies:
• a) the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, always a winner, and the Condorcet winner criterion.
•
b) the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, monotonicity, and the Condorcet winner criterion.
• c) the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and the Condorcet winner criterion.
d) the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, Pareto, and the Condorcet winner criterion.
Proof. It is obvious considering Theorem 3.1. ⊣
Condorcet with an amendment and Seq. Pairs with an amendment procedure
Before considering the rest of the possible cases, we introduce following two procedures and investigate their properties which we mentioned in this article.
Condorcet with an amendment procedure
This protocol is done the same as Condorcets method, with the difference that in the end we remove those alternatives with the social disappointment from the set of social choice.
Seq. Pairs with an amendment procedure
This protocol is done the same as Seq. Pairs, with the difference that in the end we remove those alternatives with the social disappointment from the set of social choice. Which properties do the procedures satisfy? The answer is given in the following Here we will only prove three items of the table above. We leave the rest for the reader (The proof will be easy to comprehend according to the given definitions and [28] sections 1.5,1.6 ). • a) the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, and the Condorcet winner criterion.
• b) the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, the Condorcet winner, and always a winner criterion.
• c) the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, the Condorcet winner, and Pareto criterion.
• d) the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, the Condorcet winner, and monotonicity criterion.
• e) the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, the Condorcet winner, and independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion.
• f ) the Pareto criterion, the Condorcet winner, and independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion.
• g) the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, monotonicity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion. First of all we choose a set of alternatives appearing lesser than the others at the bottom of individual preference lists. If this set has only one member, it would be the social choice. Otherwise we remove the remaining alternatives and run the L.U. procedure for the set obtained from the first stage, and keep doing this until there will be no continuing. The obtained set in the last repetition would be the social choice. This protocol satisfies AAW, monotonicity, Pareto, and nonexistence of S.D. criterion, but does not satisfy CWC, and IIA criterion. Finally we must note that the well-known procedures that satisfy the condition IIA are Condorcet extension which means that they choose the Condorcet winner whenever one exists. Since CWC is not compatible with the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, we dont know whether there are some social choice procedures for three alternatives that satisfy the nonexistence of S.D. criterion, always a winner criterion, and independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion. This question can be a motivation for future work.
History and Related Works
Kenneth Arrow showed that it is impossible to design a voting rule that satisfies some very natural properties (Arrow, 1950) [2] . This seminal work is thus named Arrows impossibility theorem, and is broadly regarded as the beginning of modern Social Choice Theory, which is an active research direction in Economics [32] . In terms of the literature, there are, as one might expect, an abundance of treatments of Arrows theorem. Two of the most notable book-length treatments are Arrow (1963) [2] and Kelly (1978) [14] . Textbook coverage (with proofs) is also widely available, including chapters in Kelly (1987) [15] , Saari (1995) [21] , and Taylor(1995) [28] .
